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Compulsory treatment
in psychiatry
Larry 0 Gostin
Legal Director of MIND
some reflections on self-
determination, patient competency
and professional expertise
The law of trespass purports to effect-
uate the common law's regard for
personal self-determination; a medically
indicated, or indeed life saving, pro-
cedure performed with reasonable care
may still amount to a battery unless the
doctor acts with the consent of the
patient? The foundation of the concept
of self-determination is the competency
of the patient to understand the nature
and quality of the proposed medical
procedure. Accordingly, the right of an
individual to self-determination may
have to be limited where the individual
is incapable of understanding the
subject matter or of expressing his
will. This may occur in a number of
medical and social contexts including
cases where patients are of particularly
old or young age, where they suffer from
certain painful or terminal illnesses,
where they are so severely physically
disabled as to be unable to express their
thoughts, or where they are severely
mentally ill or mentally handicapped.
The law of medicine is not sufficiently
comprehensive or coherent in its ex-
pression by the courts to justify a
conclusive statement concerning the
legal test of competency. Nevertheless
one can broadly observe that the test
appears to be an individual one relating
to the person's capability for compre-
hension at a particular time and in
respect of a particular decision. There
do not appear to be any fixed rules
governing consent which are based upon
age, legal status, medical condition,
diagnosis, or prognosis?
The one notable exception to this
principle is the rigid distinction based
upon legal status which is drawn under
the Mental Health Act 1959 between
informal and compulsorily detained
psychiatric patients. The conventional
legal view is that the former class of
patient is entitled to the same pro-
tections under the common law as are
afforded to patients in general medicine,
while the latter class is not entitled to
that protection and can have treatment
imposed without consent?
Legal concern for the right of self-
-determination of the psychiatric patient
has traditionally ceased at the hospital
door on the assumption that, while the
law could set procedural and substantive
standards in respect of compulsory
admission, it could not interfere in the
clinical relationship which must be
established following admission. Further
assumptions are that the compulsory
admission process itself provides a
conclusive determination of a person's
competency to make treatment decisions
and that the doctor possesses suf-
ficiently scientific and objective
medical knowledge to enable him to
make reliable and valid choices con-
cerning diagnosis and treatment. The
authority of the psychiatric profession
to administer treatment against the
express wishes of detained patients has
no apparent boundary based upon the
nature of the treatment, its proven
efficacy, its irreversible or adverse
effects, or its risks.
In this article I will examine the
rationale, in legal and policy terms, of
the inextricable association traditionally
formed between certification and incom-
petency. I will argue that forming
categories of people in which the law
automatically dispenses with the
requirement of seeking consent is
fraught with conceptual inconsistencies
and practical difficulties. I will further
1. See eg, Devlin, Samples
of Law Making, 1962.
2. See generally, Williams,
Euthanasia, 41 Medico-
-legal Journal 14, 24,
1973; Rosovsky, Con-
sent to Treatment, 11
Osgood Hall L J 103,
1973; Kennedy, The
Legal Effect of Re.
quests by the Terminally
Ill and Aged Not to
Receive Further Treat-
ment from Doctors, 1976
Crim L Rev 217; Skegg,
Consent to Medical
Procedures on Minors,
36 Mod L Rev 370, 1973;
Gostin, The Merger of
Incompetency and Cert-
ification : The Illustr.
ation of Unauthorised
Medical Treatment in the
Psychiatric Context, 2
Internat Jol of Law and
Psychiatry 127, 1979,
pp 137- 40.
3. This article is based
upon the as sumption
that compulsory ad-
mission under s26 of
the Mental Health Act
1959 does authorise
compulsory treatment.
This conventional view
is accepted by a number
of official, medical and
1 e gal commentators.
See HM Govt, Review of
the Mental Health Act
1959, Cmnd 7320 (1978);
The Report of the Com-
mittee on Hospital Com-
plaints Procedure pares
7.34-35, 1973; Medical
Defence Union, Consent
to Treatment 1972;
Clarke, The COHSE
Report on the Manage
ment of Violent Patients:
Counsel's Opinion, The
Bulletin of the Roy81
College of Psychiatrists
argue that clinical judgments made
without the consent of the patient should
be made subject to an independent
statutory review. Such a review pro-
cedure could also be adopted for treat-
ments which are unusually hazardous,
irreversible or not fully established even
if the doctor purports to proceed with the
consent of the patient.
The competency of detained patients
to consent to psychiatric treatment
The fixed distinction relating to the
right to refuse treatment based upon
legal status contained in the 1959 Act
could be justified only by demonstrating
that detained patients as a class are
incapable of making rational treatment
decisions. Indeed, in psychiatry and
law the entire edifice of forcible treat-
ment is erected upon the presumed
incompetence of patients to consent to
medical procedures. Any other position
would be arbitrary; if a patient has the
capability reasonably to understand the
nature and purpose of treatment, there is
no more justification for disregarding his
own conception of his self interest than
there is in the case of any other patient
- whether physically or psychiatrically
disabled. The rationale of mental health
law, then, is that admission status
provides sufficient information regarding
a person's competency so that further
examination of the ability of an individ-
ual to comprehend any particular treat-
ment is unnecessary. Informality in the
admission process creates a virtually
irrefutable presumption of competency
throughout hospital residency, while a
compulsory status creates the opposite
presumption.
The medical and social grounds for the
decision to differentiate on the basis of
admission status are inadequate for
several reasons. First, the medical
circumstances necessitating admission
are not necessarily the same as those
requiring enforced treatment; hospital-
isation and legal competence in a variety
of contexts are not directly related
Second, the medical condition of
patients on a hospital ward and their
competency to make rational treatment
decisions do not systematically vary
according to legal status. It would be
impracticable and inequitable if a valid
refusal of an informal patient were
accepted, while the same refusal of an
involuntary patient with equal mental
faculties were overridden. (Detention
itself could not be the conclusive factor
for this would cause equal contradiction
if the detained psychiatric population
were compared to other detained popul-
ations who retain the common law right
to refuse medical procedures.) Third,
unsoundness of mind is usually disabling
in limited respects only. Scientific and
clinical comparisons of the total range
of behaviour exhibited by mentally
disordered persons with behaviour
exhibited by 'normal' individuals show
significant overlap in the two popul-
ations. Mentally disordered people are
normal in many areas of functioning and
for significant periods of time. Even
when patients are actively experiencing
the symptomatology of a mental illness,
much of their behaviour will be normal.
Further, during periods where their
symptomatology is in remission, their
behaviour and cognition are not reliably
distinguishable from normal persons!
In respect of competency, then, mentally
ill patients - even if validly under
detention - are to a significant extent
capable of rational thought and be-
haviour. This is not to suggest that a
refusal to receive prescribed treatment
cannot sometimes be a product of a
patient's distorted cognition or affect.
However, this should not be the inevit-
able presumption of the law. Indeed,
patients in large institutions may
sometimes experience side-effects and
adverse reactions from medication or
other treatment before they are adequate-
ly observed or heeded by nurses or
doctors who may not have the time to
listen carefully when faced with ex-
cessive caseloads. Respect for a
patient's observations about how he
feels and how treatment affects him is
necessary not merely to safeguard his
rights; they are also highly relevant to
the medical and social decision to be
taken about his welfare.
If it were possible to draw any firm
conclusion as to a person's competency
solely on the basis of legal status, it
would be that an infornmal status might
sometimes indicate a greater lack of
understanding than a compulsory status.
A patient is admitted informally if he
consents to admission or if he is unable
February 1979. This
traditional view, how-
ever, has been quest-
ioned in some quarters.
Jacob, The Right of the
Mental Patient to his
Psychosis, 39 MLR 17,
1976; Gostin, supra,
note 2 at pp 142-48.
4. See Russell-Davis,
Compulsion Under Part
IV of the Mental Health
Act 1959, 2 Internat Jol
Law and Psychiat 169,
1979; A Stone, Mental
Health and Law : A
System in Transition
68-70, 1975.
5. For a review of the
psychiatric literature
see Morse, Crazy Be-
haviour Morals and
Science : An Analysis
of Mental Health Law,
51 S Cal L Rev 527-77,
1978.
to make a decision. The latter category
of patient may be termed 'non-volitional'
- eg severely mentally handicapped or
severely depressed people who are
unable to express their will. These
patients, because they are classified as
informal, are paradoxically presumed to
be competent to make treatment de-
cisions. The use of compulsory ad-
mission procedures are restricted to
those who are volitional and able
cogently to state an objection. Here,
there is at least a prima facie indication
of competency, but they may be auto-
matically presumed to be unable to make
any decision about psychiatric treatment.
This observation is put forward to
underline the concept that the law
should, wherever possible, avoid rigid
outcomes based upon legal status. The
simplistic assumption that compulsory
admission status can be regarded as an
accurate, and the sole, measure of
competency in respect of individual
treatments is not in accordance with
scientific evidence and clinical observ-
ation s.
Reliability of medical judgments
fact or illusion ?
Legal and medical thought concerning
the propriety of allowing mentally ill or
mentally handicapped people to exercise
judgment in respect of treatment de-
cisions appears to be this. Mental
patients are considered to be detained
in hospital because they are unable to
make reasonably informed judgments
concerning the need for treatment.
Members of the medical profession are
delegated the task of determining those
who are lacking competence in this
regard and then to substitute their
judgment for that of the person con-
cerned. It is the benefit that is said to
accrue to the patient which is thought to
justify the deprivation of his ordinary
right to self-determination. It follows
that the law operates on the assumption
that psychiatrists can reliably and
validly diagnose particular forms of
mental disorder, that treatments with
reasonably established efficacy exist,
and that psychiatrists can make reason-
ably consistent and objective judgments
concerning the need for a treatment
response to a particular medical con-
dition. The evidence to support each of
these assumptions is highly equivocal.
Diagnoses
One of the most researched areas in
psychiatry and social science is the
ability of practitioners to make reliable
and valid diagnoses of mental illness.
Reliability is a term used to describe
the frequency of agreement when two or
more independent observers answer the
same qtestion; that is the ability of
psychiatrists to agree upon a diagnosis
when viewing the same person or an
identical set of symptoms. Research has
repeatedly demonstrated that psych-
iatrists cannot make reliable diagnoses
under normal clinical conditions, al-
though refinement of diagnostic skills
by experimentally imposed standardis-
ation of interview techniques, noso-
logical nomenclature and psychiatric
training tends to improve diagnostic
reliability! Further, a diagnosis often
does not convey specific and accurate
information about how a patient is
currently behaving, why he is behaving
in that way or how he is likely to behave
in the future. Diagnoses do not appear
to be reasonably precise; the same
behaviour or affect may be indicative of
different diagnoses, while a single
diagnosis may incorporate a large range
of behaviour and affect. The value of
diagnoses, therefore, for the purpose of
determining, in a reasonably precise
way, legally relevant issues such as
compulsory admission, competency and
forcible treatment is problematic.
Treatment
There is no conclusive evidence in
psychiatry concerning the aetiology of
most forms of psychiatric illness, nor is
there a clear understanding of why many
treatments are thought to have a bene-
ficial effect. Nevertheless, there is
some evidence that each of the three
major somatic treatments - electro-
convulsive therapy,' psychosurgery8 and
medication9 - are empirically effective
in the treatment of particular psychiatric
conditions.
It has to be observed that the therap-
eutic effect of each treatment is narrowly
limited to particular clinical conditions
and depends for its effectiveness on the
way it is used. Moreover, use of certain
treatments intensively or over long
periods of time can result in adverse
effects which far outweigh any potential
6. For a review of the vol-
uminous scientific liter-
ature on reliability and
validity of psychiatric
diagnoses see L Gostin,
A Human Condition, vol
1, 37-52, 1975.
7. See generally, R Palmer
(ed) Electroconvulsive
Therapy : An Appraisal,
1981 ; Clare, Therapeutic
and Ethical Aspects of
Electro-convulsive Ther-
apy : A British Per-
spective, 1 Internat Jol
Law and Psychiat 237,
1978.
8. See generally, Bridges
and Bartlett, Psycho-
surgery : Yesterday and
Today, 131 Brit Jol of
Psychiatry 249, 1977;
Gostin, Ethical Consid-
erations of Psychosurg-
ery : The Unhappy
Legacy of the Pte-
-Frontal Lobotomy, 6 J
Med Ethics 149, 1980.
9. See geherally, Kennedy,
The Use of Psychiatric
Drugs for Decades, 137
Brit Jol Psychiat 387,
1980.
benefit. The principal difficulty in
respect of these treatments and the area
of disagreement at the interface of
medicine and law is as follows. Psych-
iatrists properly observe that the major
somatic treatments can be beneficial and
can have acceptable levels of risk.
Accordingly, the medical view is that
safeguards are not warranted and that
decisions about treatment should be left
exclusively to the medical profession.
The difficulty with this position is the
fact that in psychiatry, as in most pro-
fessions, there is a wide range of
competence and expertise as well as
limited time and resources with which to
take decisions. The consistent findings
of the major hospital enquiries in the
last decade have shown that treatments
are not necessarily limited to inter-
ventions with established efficacy and
safety, and that the major somatic
treatments are sometimes used far too
extensively and can result in severe
adverse effects for the patient 0  It
should also be observed that psych-
iatrists have been shown to exhibit a
singular style of treatment response and
to categorise patients medically in a
relatively fixed way which is inde-
pendent of the symptoms observed.
There appears to be an overall predis-
position to diagnose psychopathology
and a propensity in individual clinicians
to diagnose and administer treatment
according to their different experience
and clinical orientation.
On what grounds should
compulsory treatment be justified ?
In order to justify an independent review
of a treatment decision, we would either
have to question the wisdom of the
doctor in taking the decision or we must
point to some specific criteria which are
neither medical nor even quasi-medical,
but are ultimately non-medical, which
makes the doctor the wrong person to
apply them. The well-established
principle of self-determination in law is
that it is improper to impose physical
treatment on a competent adult while
conscious and cogently expressing an
objection! 2  Accordingly, competency
and consent should logically be seen to
be the foundation of any decision to
impose treatment on a patient. These
concepts are not medical but essentially
lay and legal. The question to be put is
not whether the patient is able to make
a more informed and expert medical
decision than the doctor, but whether he
is able to understand the nature, purpose
and risks of the treatment and to express
his will rationally. A doctor may well
be able to tell us the benefits of a
particular treatment, but the decision
about whether it is proper to impose it
upon an unwilling patient, thus under-
mining his dignity and physical integrity,
is ultimately a social and lay judgment
and should not rest on medical grounds
alone.
If a psychiatric patient is competent and
expressly refuses to consent to treat-
ment, his views should be respected.
This is the position in general medicine
and, if a psychiatric patient is com-
petent, there are no rational grounds for
distinguishing his legal position from
that of the physically ill patient. This
is not necessarily to suggest that it is
in a patient's best interests to refuse
treatment, but only that it would be an
unjustifiable affront to his human dignity
and self-esteem if treatment were to be
imposed directly against his express
wishes. There can be no greater
intrusion on a competent human being
than to compel him to receive physical
treatment which he does not want.
The parameters of the argument should
therefore be placed in perspective.
There should be no interference with
individual clinical judgment where, in
the usual case, there is consent to an
established and safe treatment. A
measured safeguard is required only
where there are strong indications
toward the need for closer examination
of a proposed treatment. Accordingly, a
review procedure would be required
where a competent patient was expressly
withholding consent. Here, one would
expect some form of review which took
account of the patient's reasons for
refusal.
The concept of 'refusal' is not identical
to the lawyers' traditional understanding
of the concept of 'consent'. The law
ordinarily examines only the issue of
whether a person has given an effective
legal consent. Failure to demonstrate
such a consent is treated identically in
law, regardless of the decisiveness of
the patient. Thus, it does not appear to
10.S E Thames Regional
Health Authority, Report
of the Committee of
Enquiry into St August-
ines Hospital, Chartham,
Canterbury, 1976; Report
of the Committee of
Enquiry into Allegations
of Ill-Treatment of
Patients and Other Ir-
regularities at the Ely
Hospital, Cardiff, Cmnd
3975, 1969; Report of
Enquiry into Normans-
field Hospital, Cmnd
7357, 1978. See also,
The Report of the Health
Service Commissioner
case W29/74-5, 1977.
11.For a review of the
literature see L Gostin,
A Human Condition, vol
1, 37-52, 1975.
12.For a recent discussion
of these issues see,
Robertson, Informed
Consent to Medical
Treatment, 97 LQR 102
1981.
matter, for the purposes of the law,
whether the patient's response to a
proposed treatment is an express refusal
or whether, as is more likely, it is
indifferent, equivocal, inconsistent,
incoherent, inappropriate or entirely
absent. In any fresh examination of the
law of consent - particularly in psych-
iatry - there may well be grounds for
differentiating among the following
categories of response: an effective
legal consent, an objection or express
withholding of consent, and a non-
-objection. A non-objection is a situ-
ation where a person does not refuse the
treatment but where he does not have the
desire or understanding to express his
will. This is exemplified by the severely
depressed or mentally handicapped
person who does not, or cannot, respond
to a suggestion that a particular treat-
ment should be administered. In such a
case, the law might find it appropriate
to appoint a guardian or other person
who could provide substituted consent.
The only other instance where an
independent review would be required is
where the treatment was classified as
unusually hazardous, irreversible or not
fully established. The definitions for
these terms are clearly difficult to arrive
at' 3 The term "hazardous" refers to the
degree of risk or possible adverse
effects of the treatment; there would
also be a need to balance this against
the potential benefit of the treatment and
whether it is regarded as "elective" -
i e whether other reasonable alternative
treatments are available' 4 The phrase
"not fully established" refers to the
available clinical and empirical evidence
which exists to support the treatment,
ie whether there is reasonable research
evidence of its efficacy. It would also
refer to the extent to which the treatment
is accepted practice within the medical
community, but that factor should not be
regarded as in any way conclusive. It
is intuitively self-evident to a lay
observer that if a treatment fulfils one
of these conditions, an independent
review would be warranted. This would
also be the case in respect of irrevers-
ible treatments - notably psychosurgery.
Thus, if a treatment poses disproportion-
ate risks, does not conform to any
medical orthodoxy or irreversibly and
significantly affects physiological or
psychological functioning, it would be
proper to require the doctor to explain
and justify his decision to an inde-
pendent authority. This proposal does
not seek to prohibit the treatment but
only to hay' the decision considered
within a wider therapeutic, social and
lay context and to give the patient a
sense of involvement in the decision-
-making process.
The question may arise whether there
should be a list of special category
treatments in a code of practice or
statutory instrument which would warrant
special safeguards. Research and
clinical practice in psychiatry continu-
ally alters professional perceptions of
particular treatments. Moreover, treat-
ments could not be rigidly classified
even if they were subject to periodic
review. Specific treatments may be
regarded as hazardous or not fully
established when used in one clinical
context, but not in another. The case of
electroconvulsive therapy is illustrative.
Electroconvulsive therapy has been
shown to be empirically effective in the
treatment of severe endogenous de-
pression," although there is some
evidence that the electrically induced
convulsion is not the critical factor
6
More importantly, there is no clinical
consensus as to its benefit in the
treatment of other psychiatric conditions
such as schizophrenia and there is no
recognised professional body of opinion
upholding its use as a method of be-
haviour control. 7  Electroconvulsive
therapy, therefore, may be regarded as
fully established in some clinical
contexts but not in others.
Electroconvulsive therapy is not norm-
ally considered hazardous, except to
the extent that any treatment has certain
hazards associated with it. It is not
unusually hazardous when account is
taken of the prospect of benefit to be
expected from the treatment in appro-
priate cases. However, the anaesthetic
which precedes ECT may be unusually
hazardous to a patient who has just
eaten a large meal or who suffers from a
heart condition. Electroconvulsive
therapy can be hazardous when admin-
istered in an unmodified form (ie without
muscle relaxant and anaesthetic), where
there are significant risks of bodily
injury," or when it is used intensively
or over a long term where there is a risk
13.Definitions for the terms
"hazardous", "irrevers-
ible" or "not fully
established" psychiatric
treatments are contained
in DHSS, A Review of
the Mental Health Act
1959 1976; Review of
the Mental Health Act
1959, Cmnd 7320, 1978.
For an analysis of the
Government's proposed
definitions see Gostin,
supra, note 2.
14.The term "elective"
therapy was discussed
in the context of electro-
-convulsive therapy in
Bolam v Friem Hospital
Committee (1957) 2 All
ER 118.
15.Freeman, Basson and
Crighton, Double Blind
Controlled Trial of
Electro - convulsive
Therapy (E C T) and
Simulated ECT in
Depressive Illness, 1
The Lancet 738-740
1978.
16.Crow et al, The North-
wick Park Electro-con.
vulsive Therapy Trial,
1 The Lancet 1317-20,
1980. (This study com-
pared the response rate
of two groups of de-
pressed patients. Both
groups received a muscle
relaxant and anaesthetic
but one did not have the
electrically induced con-
vulsion. The results
showed no significant
differences in the effect
of the treatment between
the experimental and
control groups after 4-6
weeks.)
17.Royal College of Psych-
iatrists, Memorandum on
the Use of Electro-Con-
vulsive Therapy, 131
Brit J Psychiat 261-72,
1977. See also Gostin,
"A Jurisprudential and
Ethical Examination of
Electroconvulsive Ther-
apy" in Electroconvuls-
ive Therapy : An Ap-
praisal, R Palmer (ed)
1981.
18.Under-Secretary of State
for Health and Social
Services, Electro-con-
vulsive Therapy (Broad-
moor Hospital), in Han-
sard 744-50, 26th Janu-
ary 1981 ; Bebbington et
al, Letter, 1 The Lancet
15th March 1980.
of memory deficit and other adverse
effects. This argument is applicable to
most other treatments; for example, the
long term use of anti-psychotic medic-
ation carries with it the risk of irrevers-
ible neurological damage such as tardive
dyskinesia. Accordingly, specific treat-
ments which are used extensively in
psychiatry such as E CT or psychotropic
medication would not necessarily qualify
for the more exacting standard of
"hazardous" or "une stablished".
Nonetheless, it would be wrong to
suggest that they could never qualify
regardless of the clinical circumstances
or manner in which they were ad-
ministered.
Consider the example of a consultant
who proposes to administer ECT in the
treatment of schizophrenia.' I specific-
ally choose this example because it is
common in large psychiatric hospitals
but there is no accepted medical ortho-
doxy in respect of ECT in the treatment
of schizophrenia. The patient may
understand the nature and purpose of
ECT but refuse to give consent because
of his genuine fear of the procedure.
One is not making a judgment about the
competence or intentions of the doctor's
judgment to suggest that ordinarily it
would not be right to impose treatment
on a genuinely unwilling patient,
particularly if there were some un-
certainty within the profession as to the
prospect of benefit in the particular
circumstances. Further, most doctors
would not wish to impose the treatment
without consent. However, if the doctor
did wish to proceed, it would be proper
to have some independent safeguard; it
would be reasonable to expect him to
explain and justify his decision to give
ECT, despite the patient's firm ob-
jection and in the absence of any
clinical consensus as to its benefit.
Similar illustrations could be envisaged
with the other major somatic treatments.
The standard pre-frontal lobotomy was
observed from its earliest use not to be
effective in the treatment of schizo-
phrenia. However, it was estimated that
some two-thirds of the 10,000 operations
conducted between 1942 and 1954 were
on patients who suffered from schizo-
phrenia?' Contemporary psychosurgery
is also used in the treatment of schizo-
phrenia despite the fact that rarely is
there any marked clinical improvement. 2'
There is also inconclusive evidence as
to the effectiveness of psychosurgery in
a number of highly diverse medical and
social conditions - for example, psycho-
surgery has been performed in the cases
of anorexia nervosa, sexual deviation,
hyper-responsiveness, aggressiveness
and anti-social behaviour. Between
1974-76 there were 16 different types of
lesions made in a minimum of 14 cerebral
sites 2  Despite the multiplicity of
existing surgical interventions, together
with their use on almost the entire range
of psychiatric and social conditions,
psychosurgery is not the subject of
specific legal or administrative regul-
ation?3
The effectiveness of the final major
somatic treatment - medication with
anti - depressive or anti - psychotic
effects - is now well established.
However, it is also well documented
that medication has been used in
dangerously high amounts and for
excessively long periods in long stay
hospital patients. Indeed, the use of
major tranquillisers in this way can
cause irreparable neurological damage
which results in uncontrollable shaking
of the limbs and other Parkinsonian-type
symptoms.?
The form of reviewv of
individual clinical judgment
The form of review of individual clinical
judgment more than any other matter
divides those who have examined the
issue. For the purposes of operating
the principles put forward in this paper,
the fundamental aspects of a review
procedure would be that it is inde-
pendent of the hospital and the detaining
authority; it is multidisciplinary in the
sense that it would include a lay
element and would not be exclusively or
predominantly medical; and it is open
and accessible in order to maintain a full
sense of patient involvement and to
ensure that its procedures and decisions
are generally amenable to public scrutiny.
Professional review or audit, represented
by second medical opinion or an
exclusively or predominantly medical
panel, would not be a sufficient safe-
guard and would not maintain the con-
fidence of the patient. This is on the
grounds that issues of competency and
19.See generally, Hazardous
and Irreversible Treat-
ments in Psychiatry -
Who Decides?, SK&F
Publications, vol 3 no 6
1980.
20. Tooth and Newton,
Leucotomy in England
and Wales 1942-54 in
Reports onPublic Health
and Medical Subjects,
no 104, 1961.
21.Bridges and Bartlett,
Psychosurgery : Yester-
day and Today, 131 Brit
J Psychiat 24-60, 1977.
22.Barraclough & Mitchell-
Heggs, Use of Neuro-
surgery for Psycho-
logical Disorder in the
British Isles during
1974-76, 2 Brit Med J
1591-93, 1978.
23.Gostin, Ethical Con-
siderations of Psycho-
surgery : The Unhappy
Legacy of the- Pre-
-Frontal Lobotomy, 6 J
Med Ethics 149- 54,
1980.
24.Kennedy, The Use of
Psychiatric Drugs for
Decades, 137 Brit J
Psychiat 387-89, 1980.
consent cannot be determined solely on
the basis of medical or scientific
expertise but require a lay, social and
commonsense judgment. The decision to
impose a treatment on an unwilling
patient requires a subjective choice
among a number of diverse values
including the purpose and importance of
the treatment, possible adverse effects
and the strength and cogency of the
patient's reasons for refusal. That
choice and balancing of values lies
outside the exclusive competence of a.
single doctor and can only partly be the'
concern of the medical profession.
An additional factor is the understand-
able reluctance within the medical
profession (or, for that matter, within
most professions) to interfere with the
judgment of a colleague who is respons-
ible for a case. Individual clinical
judgment or clinical autonomy is an
important part of the thought and training
of medicine; a doctor who is not directly
responsible for a patient would be faced
with formidable professional restraints
if he had openly and directly to contra-
dict a colleague, particularly where his
second opinion would take precedence
over the opinion of the responsible
consultant. This form of peer review
would be particularly unacceptable if it
permitted the doctor to choose a col-
league from whom he would seek a
concurring opinion. One would expect
the doctor to choose an individual with
similar clinical orientation, training and
experience and there would be consider-
able informal pressure toward conformity
where the two doctors had to maintain a
continuing professional relationship.
There would also be questions raised as
to whether the doctor could 'canvas'
opinion - i e seek a second or third
opinion if the first did not concur.
Some of these reservations may be partly
illusory. However, exclusive pro-
fessional self-regulation is always open
to the criticism that it is not sufficiently
energetic or dispassionate, that there
may be informal pressures to protect a
fellow member of the profession and that
the views of questioning non-profession-
als may not be given sufficient weight.
Confidence of the patient and public
would be maintained only by inde-
pendent examination and review of
individual clinical judgment.
In devising a properly constituted
second opinion, it is important to avoid,
wherever possible, cumbersome, expens-
ive or time-consuming machinery. For
this purpose, it may be preferable if the
second opinion were associated with a
currently existing institutional structure.
Mental health review tribunals or inde-
pendent hospital ethical committees are
not currently used for evaluating clinical
treatments. (Mental health review
tribunals are empowered to examine
issues of discharge but not treatment
and hospital ethical committees evaluate
the clinical and ethical aspects of
medical research.) Nonetheless, con-
sideration may be given to adapting such
institutional structures for use in this
context. The use of mental health
review tribunals particularly commends
itself because they have existing panels
of legal, medical and lay members, they
are at present substantially under-used
and there is a government proposal to
increase the size of the tribunal by
adding a social work member-'
Conclusion
There is an unquestioning acceptance
among many legislators, lawyers and
doctors that judgments concerning a
patient's body may validly be removed
from the individual and delegated to
experts in the psychiatric, but not the
general medical, context. The assump-
tions are that a person is detained
because he is incompetent to make any
treatment decision; that the doctor can
make reasonably reliable and objective
judgments concerning diagnosis and
treatment; and that the benefit the
patient would accrue from forcible
treatment would outweigh any interest he
may have in self determination. It has
been the burden of this paper to illustr-
ate that these assumptions are automatic
responses to involuntary admission to
hospital which are supported more by
intuition than by scientific fact or
jurisprudential thought. There is an
intuitive medico-legal disposition to
hold a psychiatric patient incompetent,
irrespective of his clinical condition or
capacity for specific rational under-
standing. This is suggested by a
number of factors including the status
of the patient as involuntary, the
doctor's primary, statutory and moral
responsibility to detain and treat the
patient rather than to respect his refusal
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of a treatment which the doctor believes
to be medically indicated, and the
natural presumption by those who regard
themselves as mentally healthy (partic-
ularly if they are endowed with special-
ist knowledge) that they have greater
understanding than the mentally infirm.
All of these factors may instigate
towards paternalism and a pre-determin-
ation of a patient's competency. Any
difference of opinion may be regarded as
a question of who is qualified to make a
decision. It is within this context that
a patient's refusal to consent may be
seen, not as a statement of will, but as
a symptom of unsoundness of mind. The
colloquialisms "doctor knows best",
"you really don't mean that" and "you
will thank me later" have become the
unwritten rules within which the merits
of a patient's consent are assessed.
Ethically, a patient should be free to
make a decision which may be against
his medical interests so long as he is
able to understand the implication of
that decision; the common law places no
legal obstacle to a patient's decision to
live in great pain or even to risk his life
rather than to accept unwanted medical
treatment. The fundamental issue,
however, is who should ultimately
decide whether the patient is capable of
understanding and whether the treatment
should be imposed against his wishes.
I have suggested that the doctor - one
of the partners in the therapeutic trans-
action - should not make the final
judgment; nor should the decision be
subject solely to professional self-
-regulation. This was intended, not to
impugn either the expertise or integrity
of the doctor, but to show the import-
ance, from the perspective of the patient
and the lay public, of introducing a
decision-making process which is inde-
pendent and in which he could have
confidence.
It is, of course, fundamental to the
therapeutic relationship that the patient
who enters hospital for treatment has
trust in the doctor and does not refuse
all forms of treatment. The law, more-
over, should not normally interfere in a
doctor-patient relationship if it is based
upon trust and consensual agreement.
However, once that trust breaks down, a
psychiatric patient, unlike physically ill
patients, will find it difficult or im-
possible to choose another doctor or
simply to leave the hospital; the
detained psychiatric patient also has
limited access to his general pract-
itioner or to a second medical opinion if
he disagrees with a particular form of
treatment. It would be wrong in these
circumstances if he were compelled in
law to accept any treatment proposed
and where, if he disagreed for whatever
reason, his only recourse was to the
same doctor who originally recommended
the treatment.
